Governments in both developing and developed economies play an active role in labor markets in the form of providing both formal public sector jobs and employment through public workfare programs. We refer to this as employment targeting. In the context of a simple search and matching friction model, we show that the propensity for the public sector to target more employment can increase the unemployment rate in the economy and lead to an increase in the size of the informal sector. Employment targeting can therefore have perverse e¤ects on labor market outcomes.
Introduction
Governments in both developed and developing economies play an active role in labor markets to meet their growth and development objectives. In the case of India, the twin phenomenon of jobless growth and the growing casualization of the work-force has led to a vibrant debate about the role of government policy in stimulating employment (see Kapoor (2017) and Abraham (2017) ). One particular intervention takes the form of the public sector being the provider of jobs. We refer to this as employment targeting. For instance, public workfare programs are amongst the most common forms of anti-poverty programs in developing countries. NREGS, the ‡agship workfare government scheme in India employs several hundred million people. In the US, the Works Projects Administration (WPA) started in 1935 was initiated in response to the Great Depression, and hired unemployed workers directly. Large scale poverty reduction is a central policy objective of developing countries in Latin America, Africa, and Asia, where employment guaranteed schemes have been at the centre of an employment oriented approach to anti-poverty policy-making (Basu et al, 2009 ). More recently, the aggressive response of …scal policy in the …nancial crisis of 2008 by developed economies has sparked a burgeoning literature on the merits of counter-cyclical government spending (see Rendahl (2016) ).
In each of these cases, the general equilibrium e¤ects of policies that target employment on overall unemployment remains a key research question. In the context of employment guarantee schemes, like NREGS, a question that arises is that by leading to an increase in wages, do employment guarantee schemes crowd out private sector employment ? In a recent paper, Muralidharan, Niehaus, and Sukhtankar (2018) study the policy-relevant general-equilibrium estimates of the total e¤ect on wages, employment, income, and assets of increasing the e¤ective presence of NREGS. They show that a public employment guarantee, by improving the outside option for workers, puts upward pressure on labor markets that drives up wages and earnings. Basu et. al (2009 ) develop a formal model of an employment guarantee scheme and show that such schemes introduce contestability in labor hiring, and raise the reservation wage. Gomes (2015) characterizes a government's acyclical wage policy that protects workers from business cycle ‡uctuations. He argues that very high public sector wages can create disincentives to private players for posting vacancies and can reduce overall employment. In this context, he proposes an optimum level of the public sector wage which maximizes welfare.
What is less understood in the literature however, is the impact of employment targeting on the size of the informal sector in developing economies. We …ll this gap in the literature. 1 There are only a handful of papers that use search and matching frameworks to study informal labor
We build a simple model of a developing country labor markets characterized by search and matching frictions. We show that public sector intervention in the labor market can lead to an increase in the size of the informal sector. Because the informal sector is characterized by a high …ring rate and lower unemployment bene…ts, employment targeting leads to an perverse e¤ects on labor market outcomes. This is our main result. We also show that, under certain parametric restrictions, an increase in the public sector hiring rate can increase employment unambiguously. In particular, we …nd it is possible that the private sector wage falls as a result of an increase in the public sector hiring rate which leads to more job creation in the private sector. This reverses the consensus …ndings in the search and matching literature which shows that an increase in public sector employment disincentivizes private sector vacancy postings, as in the paper by Gomes (2015).
The Model
The economy is comprised of three in…nitely lived agents: …rms, agents or workers, and the government. Heterogeneous individuals are uniformly distributed according to their abilities. Each individual's ability is indexed as i 2 (0; 1) where 0 is the lowest ability and 1 is the highest ability. Since agents do not have any other distinguishing features, they are indexed as i. Firms present in the economy produce a single …nal good which is consumed by agents. We call a private …rm's production unit as the "private sector", denoted by P . The government's production unit is termed as "public sector", denoted by G. Unemployed agents are denoted by U: Agents are risk neutral and their utility comes only from consuming the …nal good.
Each agent has one unit of labour endowment, which he supplies inelastically in each point of time. However, the labour market is characterized by frictions. Private sector …rms and agents face search and matching friction before commencing production activity. Unemployed agents search for jobs irrespective of their abilities and can search for both private sector and public sector jobs. Vacant …rms looking for workers post a vacancy by paying a vacancy posting cost, d > 0. Private sector …rms and job seekers are matched according to a Pissarides style matching function: m = m(u; v), where u is the number of unemployed, and v is the number of vacant …rms (Pissarides 2000). The function, m, is homogeneous of degree one, concave, and increasing in each of its arguments. Hence, Unemployed agents get an amount, b > 0; which is an unemployment bene…t from the government. Workers who are employed in the private sector get a per period wage, w i , according to their ability. The …ring rate in the private sector is given by > 0. The rate at which an unemployed agent …nding a public sector job is given by > 0. The parameter can be considered as the hiring rate of public sector. We assume that the government pays a …xed wage to its employees, w; irrespective of their ability. The …ring rate in the public sector is given by,~ . Therefore, in a small time span, t, an unemployed agent can get a public sector job with a probability, t, while a public sector worker can be …red with the probability,~ t. Similarly, a private sector job match can break with probability, t; within t. r is the discount rate in the economy. Finally, we assume that a job seeker cannot get a net surplus from a public sector job and a private sector job simultaneously. All the public/private job creation and job destruction rates follow a Poission process as in Pissarides (2000).
We formalize the public sector's employment policy by the policy-tuple, { w; b; } and call this the employment targeting policy of the government. Our main focus in this paper, however, is on the parameter, ; and its e¤ect on unemployment and informalization.
Steady state
In this paper, we focus on characterizing the steady state. Let V i j denote the in…nite income stream of the i th worker, where the state j = P; G; U: This implies that
This implies that the ‡ow value of a private sector job (or a …lled vacancy), rV i P , equals the wage from the private sector job (w i ) plus the expected net surplus from being unemployed if the private sector job is destroyed ( (V i U V i P )) : Analogously, the ‡ow value of being employed in the public sector is given by
and lends it to a similar interpretation to equation (1), except now, the wage in the public sector is given by w; with the job destruction rate in the public sector given by~ : The ‡ow value of being unemployed is given by,
which equates the ‡ow value of being unemployed, rV i U ; to the level of the unemployment bene…t, b; plus the net surplus from …nding a job in either the private sector or public sector. Since workers cannot work in both sectors simultaneously, there is no net surplus associated with joint employment in both sectors.
Subtracting equation (3)from (1) yields
Likewise, subtracting equation (3) from (2), and solving for
Equation (5) gives the net surplus of being employed in the public sector relative to the net surplus of being employed in the private sector. Likewise, substituting equation (5) into equation (4) and manipulating terms yields,
Equation (6) expresses the net return of a productive matching to a worker. After a productive matching, workers receive V i P but at the cost of sacri…cing V i U : We denote the value functions of in…nitely lived private …rms as J i P and J i V , where P stands for productive matching and v stands for a vacancy, respectively. The ‡ow value of a productively matched private …rm is given by
and for a …rm with a vacancy,
Equation (8) contains the term E(J i P ): A vacant …rm does not know about a worker's ability prior to a successful match and therefore, does not know the exact return before the …rm gets matched with a worker. Instead, vacant …rms use the information about expected returns from a …lled job, E(J i P ); to take a vacancy posting decision. In equilibrium …rms entry and exit freely in the market such that
Equation (8) therefore implies that
Likewise, substituting J V = 0 into equation (7) and solving for J i P yields
which is increasing in the ability of the i th worker. Notice that for a private sector …rm, the net return from a productive matching is given by,
Wage Bargaining
The Nash bargaining solution is the w i that satis…es
where 2 (0; 1) represents worker bargaining power. It is imperative to understand the e¤ect of heterogeneous agents in the bargaining process. Since, each individual has an unique ability, his corresponding wage is also unique. This has an important implication in wage bargaining. If the workers were homogeneous then one individual could not a¤ect the wage rate which is available outside ones particular job match, because there would be a large number of similar agents participating in the labour market. One agent would be too small to a¤ect the rest of the market. However, in the present set up with heterogeneous ability, this argument does not hold. A matched worker knows that, ceteris paribus, any wage decision in a particular matching is going to replicate in all possible productive matchings because each agent is unique in their ability, i. In other words, a change in w i also changes the agent's outside option, V i U . This implies that,
The …rst order maximization condition is given by
To obtain an expression for
; we di¤erentiate equation (6) to get
Substituting equation (14) and
from (11) and putting these into equation (13), we obtain an expression for w i :
Equation w i is increasing in the ability of the i th worker, although since our focus is on employment targeting, we would like to know how an increase in ; the hiring rate of the public sector, a¤ects the optimal wage. To see this, recall equation (13). Using equations (1), (7), and (9), we can re-write (13) as
Using equations (1), (2), and (3), it is easy to show that, r
: Using this, and after a few algebraic manipulations, we obtain
The …rst term on the right hand side, rV i U ; is the minimum compensation a worker requires to give up search (Pissarides, 2000). On top of this, the worker requires a fraction of the rent, or net surplus, that a productive match generates. It can be shown that if increases, then both rV i U (because a public sector job serves as an outside option for a private sector worker) and the square bracketed term on the right hand side are increasing. However, due to an increase in rV i U ; the term, i rV i U , is falling, or the surplus itself is less. Since the proportionate share of the surplus accruing to the worker is more (because of the monopoly power of the i th worker), the e¤ect of the fall in net surplus pulls the wage down, and gets ampli…ed. This means that an increase in creates an ambiguous e¤ect on the wage.
Equilibrium
Recall that agents are distributed uniformly over the interval [0; 1]: Therefore, from equation (11), we have
Substitute out for w i in equation (17) (17) is : Hence,
Equating equation (10) and (18) implies, 
Comparative Statics
We are interested in the impact of employment targeting, or the public sector's hiring objectives on the overall level of unemployment. To obtain this, we totally di¤erentiate both sides of equation (19) with respect to to obtain
where " m (1; ) is the elasticity of the matching function with respect to ; i.e.,
We can interpret the above condition more precisely if we consider the class of matching functions with constant elasticity. In this case, the right hand side of equation (22) will be a constant in terms of d; w; b; ; and " m ; which we denote by : Equation (22) can be written as There is an important corollary to Proposition 1, which relates to the case when ( w b) ! 0: In this case, the public sector wage is so low, that it is close to the per-period unemployment bene…t, b: It is easily seen from equation (19) that the equation is independent of : This implies that changes in have no impact on ; or on the rate of getting a private sector job and a private sector wage. This implies that an increase in unambiguously reduces u : Intuitively, ( w b) is the net surplus from working in the public sector relative to being unemployed. As the net surplus falls, the outside option (the public sector job) facing a worker in the bargaining process to determine his wage is negligible. This is true for a …rm too. So the private sector o¤ers more vacancies. There is more matching. And this leads to lower unemployment.
Informal Sector
In this section we extend the baseline model above to include an informal sector. Our main goal is to derive conditions under which employment targeting by the public sector can lead to an increase in the size of the informal sector. We assume that labor is divided into two categories: formal and informal. As before, within the formal sector, there is a public sector and a private sector, and their characterization remains the same. The description of the informal sector is as follows. Private sector …rms operate in both the informal and formal sector (example, textiles, or leather goods). If they operate in the informal sector, they pay a training cost, c; once they are matched with a worker. After receiving the training, the productivity of all matched workers (in the informal sector) becomes the same, and workers get a wage corresponding to their new productivity. Hence, the heterogeneity in ability of the worker is not re ‡ected in the wage that they receive in the informal sector. We assume that the …ring rate is higher in the informal sector than in the formal sector. For simplicity, we assume that the …ring rate of the informal sector is 1. Firms post vacancies unless the returns to posting vacancies becomes zero. When the returns from posting a vacancy becomes zero, there is no incentive for …rms to enter into the market. In the informal sector, …rms and job seekers match through the typical matching function used in the previous section, except that here the outside option is, by assumption, b I < b.
In the formal sector, individual ability is uniformly distributed over [i ; 1]; while in the informal sector, individual ability is distributed over [0; i ]: 3 We solve for all endogenous variables in the steady state. In addition, we also characterize the problem for the pivotal worker, who is indi¤erent between working in the informal and formal sectors.
Labor market in the informal sector
Let V I U denote the value function corresponding to the in…nite income stream of an unemployed worker in the informal sector (I): The value function does not include the subscript i which corresponds to individual ability; as mentioned before, workers get a homogenous return. Similarly, V I E is the value function corresponding to the in…nite income stream of an employed worker in the informal sector. The ‡ow values are given by
and
where I is the market tightness in the informal sector, and w I is the wage rate in the informal sector. 
where p > 0 is the constant productivity from a productive matching in the informal sector. After a productive matching, …rms pay the wage, w I ; and the training cost, c: As before, in equilibrium J V = 0 due to the free entry condition. The wage in the informal sector, like the private sector wage, is determined by Nash bargaining. However, the di¤erence relative to the previous section is that in case of the informal sector, an individual's di¤erential ability is not re ‡ected in their productivity. Hence, the wage in the informal sector is the same for all workers. For the same reason, in this bargaining problem, the assumption that one individual worker's decision cannot change the outside option is a valid one. 4 
Wage Bargaining
The Nash bargaining solution is the w I that satis…es
The maximization exercise yields
which implies
or,
Equation (28) can be also be written as (30) into equation (24), we obtain
Since the free entry condition requires that J I V = 0; from equation (27), we obtain
Substituting the value of J I E from (32) into (31) yields
Putting this back into (29) yields,
Hence, the optimal wage in the informal sector is a positive function of labor market tightness was not valid.
in the informal sector, I : What is noteworthy is that for a given I ; a rise in the training cost leads to a fall in the informal sector wage. This is because a rise in training costs reduces the surplus accruing to the informal sector …rm, which responds by reducing its wage rate. From equation (26) 
The Formal Sector
Individuals from [i ; 1] work in the formal sector. We determine i endogenously in equilibrium. As mentioned in the previous section, the wage in the formal sector is an increasing function of an individual's ability (see equation (16)). Since the return from the informal sector is independent of the ability of the worker (i.e., …xed), an individual with higher ability is incentivized to work harder in the formal sector. In essence, the formal sector here is not di¤erent from the previous section, apart from the fact that the formal sector corresponds to individuals with ability distributed over [i ; 1]. As a result, equation (17) becomes
Recall that the expression for w i in the formal sector is given by (15). We proceed in steps. First,
Therefore,
Substituting the value of R 1 i (i w i )di above into equation (36) and simplifying yields,
from (10) with the expression given above in equation (37), we obtain
(38) Equation (38) depicts the equilibrium relationship between and i which guarantees a …rms' free entry and exit. Here, and i are positively related, as long as > : If i increases, to clear the labor market, more …rms enter and increase the number of vacancies. This is because a …rms'entry decision is based on the expected return from a …lled post. Since i ; increases, and the upper bound of ability is 1; the average productivity in the formal sector must rise. In other words, more able individuals are left, and therefore average productivity must be higher.
Since we have two endogenous variables ( and i ), we need another equation to pin down both variables. We turn to this in the next section.
Equivalence of Formal and Informal Sectors
In the previous sub-section, we assumed the existence of an interior solution where the work force could be partitioned between the formal and informal sectors. Therefore, there must be a marginal worker who is indi¤erent between joining the informal and formal sectors. We denote the marginal worker as i : Since the ability of every individual in the population is indexed by i, the marginal worker's ability is indexed by i : Therefore, the ‡ow value of search for a job in the formal sector for the marginal worker is rV i U : Likewise, in the informal sector, it is given by rV I U : Since the individual with i ability is indi¤erent between joining both the informal sector and formal sector, it follows that
Using equation (3) and equation (5) 
Wage determination in the formal sector is determined from:
): Using equation (14) in this expression yields
We now have (V 
Equilibrium
Equations (38) and (43) denote the labor market equilibrium and equivalence equations, respectively. The solution of these two equations solve for i and endogenously. However, equation (43) depicts an ambiguous relationship between and i : This makes the conclusion unclear.
Comparative Statics
We focus on an analytical special case to …nd whether employment targeting can have an impact on the composition of the workforce between the informal and formal sectors. Later, we consider a numerical example that shows that our result is more general. We consider the special case where ( w b) ! 0: Note that I has already been solved in equation (34) and (35). Equation (43) now shows a negative relationship between i and . Equation (38) has a positive intercept in the i and plane, for ( w b) ! 0: This ensures an interior equilibrium for i and , as shown in Figure 4 . In Figure 4 , if the government decides to increase its hiring rate (increase ), or target a higher employment rate (when ( w b) ! 0); equation (38) remains unchanged, but (43) shifts upward. In this case, market tightness in the formal sector, and the size of the informal sector -i and respectively, both rise. This is because an increase in the market tightness of the formal sector results in a rise in the rate of obtaining a job in the formal sector. We summarize this result in terms of the following proposition. Proposition 2 Suppose ( w b) ! 0: Then an increase in ; or more public sector hiring, increases 1) market tightness in the formal sector ( ) and 2) the size of the informal sector (i ).
The intuition is as follows. When ( w b) ! 0; the per-period (net) return to public sector employment tends to zero. If the public sector expands, the marginal job seeker, i ; who was originally getting the same return as if he was in the informal sector …nds it detrimental to stay in the formal sector, since staying in this sector is not remunerative. However, once i increases, starts increasing to clear the market because the average productivity in the formal sector is higher, and more …rms enter into the market. This creates more vacancies, which means increases. Hence, as increases, provided that ( w b) ! 0, both and i increase. Thus, the size of the informal sector increases.
There is an interesting implication with training costs. As c increases, the opposite happens (the size of the informal sector falls). This is because I falls and this shifts equation (43) backwards although equation (38) remains unchanged. As I falls staying in the informal sector becomes less remunerative because the rate of getting a job is lower. So i falls. To clear the labor market, also falls.
Numerical Exercise
The assumption of ( w b) ! 0 is a special case. What happens if ( w b) is su¢ ciently small but non-zero ? We show that the results of Proposition 2 go through, at least locally, using arbitrary parameters that allows for a su¢ ciently small w b > 0. 5 We utilize a matching function of Cobb-Douglas form: au a 1 v (1 a 1 ) . Table 1 below summarizes the parameter values.
Figures 5, and 6 characterize the equilibrium in informal and formal markets respectively. Figure 5 , generated using equations (34) and (35), shows an interior solution corresponding to the parameters for the informal sector where w > b. We assume = 0:5 in the baseline case. The numerical solution of I is 0.14. While this number is arbitrary, it says that of all the job seekers in the informal sector, at most only 14% of them can be matched with vacancies in the informal sector. Now, we increase the government hiring rate, ; to 0:8. Figure 7 below shows that for a small but non zero ( w b) a higher leads to an increase in both ; i consistent with the result in Proposition 2. As i increases, the size of the informal sector increases. This increases ;which means compared to the earlier case (where earlier roughly half of the job seekers could get a job in the formal sector), now more than half can get a job in the formal sector since the return from posting a vacancy in the formal sector has increased. However, since the informal sector is characterized by a higher …ring rate (1); and lower unemployment bene…ts, the rise in leads to a perverse labor market outcome. 
Conclusion and Policy Implications
Many governments as part of their growth and development objectives, play an active role in labor markets. Such interventions come in the form of setting a minimum wage, providing unemployment bene…ts, and directly hiring workers. We refer to this as employment targeting. In the context of a simple search and matching friction model with heterogenous agents, we show that the propensity for the public sector to target more employment can increase the unemployment rate in the economy and leads to an increase in the size of the informal sector. Employment targeting can therefore have perverse e¤ects on labor market outcomes. We also …nd it is possible that the private sector wage falls as a result of an increase in the public sector hiring rate which leads to more job creation in the private sector. This reverses the consensus …ndings in the search and matching literature which shows that an increase in public sector employment disincentivizes private sector vacancy postings.
